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Abstract 
Industrial policy hovers in the intellectual space between market failure and government 
failure.  Can subnational competition overcome government failure and make industrial 
policy more effective?  The empirical evidence is limited and inconclusive.  This paper 
analyzes the first and second-order effects of federalist reforms, and then distinguishes 
‘between’ vs. ‘within’-competition.  Federalism’s first-order effects are on public sector 
efficiency, effectiveness, and the quality of public decision-making – that is to say, 
government failure or success.  It only affects industrial policy indirectly, through this 
channel.  When diverse economic interests and civic groups interact through politics to 
reveal, debate, and trade off their competing interests, and so fashion policy, 
government will tend to be responsive and accountable.  Where economic interests are 
homogeneous or civil society is inert, government failure looms.  Further second-order 
effects of federalism include increasing the level of competition in a political system, and 
limiting the power of government against citizens in ways that make democracy 
compatible with open access regimes.  Industrial policy is far more likely to succeed in 
this context due to greater economic participation and dynamism. 
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1. Introduction 
The pro-market, deregulating economic policy reforms of the 1990s and 2000s failed to 
generate sustained growth in the most enthusiastic reformers, such as the US and UK, 
delivering instead the 2008-09 financial crisis, followed by a painful, drawn-out, 
recession that has yet to end.  The reality of policy failure has combined in recent years 
with the determined advocacy of structuralism by development thinkers such as Ha-
Joon Chang, Robert Wade and Joseph Stiglitz to lift industrial policy out of intellectual 
cold storage and return it if not into the mainstream, at least on the agenda of policy 
thinking about development.  Wade’s (2012) article heralding the return of industrial 
policy, along with the success of books such as Chang (2011), and Stiglitz (2010), the 
creation of the Competitive Industries and Innovation Program at the World Bank, and 
indeed the fact that a conference on industrial policy such as the one for which this 
paper was prepared is hosted by the Bank, all underline this last point. 
The question of industrial policy hovers in the intellectual space between market 
failure and government failure.  One’s position on industrial policy largely flows from 
which peril one considers to be more pervasive, or to have worse welfare 
consequences.  Market failure refers to situations in which market incentives lead to 
inefficient provision of important goods and services.  Where development is concerned, 
some of the most important market failures include the under-provision of research and 
development, and knowledge more generally, public goods and private goods with 
significant spillovers, goods or sectors where policy uncertainty strongly affects 
expected returns, the coordination of private investments that are complementary, and 
“strategic” goods with large network effects, such as roads, railways, or 
telecommunications, which can spur the development of new businesses in a variety of 
sectors that are hard to predict.  The existence of such market failures is a prima facie 
argument for government action, and many of the failures listed above further argue 
specifically in favor of industrial policy. 
Government failure can be defined as government action, often prompted by an 
attempt to correct market failure, that leads to greater inefficiencies in the allocation of 
resources.  Government failure can come about through a variety of mechanisms.  Two 
of the most obvious occur when public decisions are taken by officials who are corrupt 
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or captured by specific interest groups, leading to policy decisions or resource 
allocations that deviate from what is socially optimal.  Other, less intentional government 
failures occur when the public sector crowds out private borrowing, or through simple 
miscalculations and mistakes by well-intentioned public officials.  Chang, Wade and 
others argue vigorously that all countries that ever developed rapidly used industrial 
policy.  But even they admit that the developed world is littered with the wreckage of 
failed public investment projects and failed industrial policies.  How can industrial policy 
practitioners work to correct market failures without incurring government failures that 
are worse? 
In recent years the claim that decentralized or federal3 competition can help to 
overcome government failure, or is even necessary for industrial policy to work, has 
gained currency.  Local and regional governments, it is argued, compete over public 
goods in their attempts to gain political popularity and win elections.  This will lead to 
rapid policy evolution at the subnational level, adaptive, localized implementation of 
policy initiatives, and higher growth.  For evidence, proponents point to what they often 
call ‘regionally decentralized authoritarianism’ in countries such as China and Vietnam, 
where federal industrial policy is seen as crucial to sustained high growth rates.  
Opponents, by contrast, claim that attempts to give subnational control over industrial 
policy will lead instead to a fiscal ‘race to the bottom’ via investor tax breaks, as we 
have arguably seen in countries such as the US and Brazil.  And proponents seem 
unable to point to direct evidence that regions and localities actually do learn from each 
other vis-à-vis industrial policy. 
 What systematic evidence can the empirical literature shed on this question?  
The literatures on decentralization and fiscal federalism are huge, numbering the 
hundreds of peer-reviewed studies in academic journals; add in the “gray literature” of 
international agency  and NGO (e.g. World Bank, IMF, Oxfam) reports and studies and 
the number ascends into the thousands.  This is in no small part because decentralizing 
reforms have proved hugely popular all over the world.  In 1999 the World Bank 
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estimated that an estimated 80-100% of the world’s countries were experimenting with 
one or another form of decentralization.  Since then, new or deepening reforms have 
been announced in more than two dozen countries.  What do so many studies of so 
many real policy experiments have to say about decentralized competition and growth?  
Or about decentralization and fiscal policy? 
 Remarkably little, it turns out.  The large majority of empirical studies of 
decentralization focus on public sector outputs such as school attendance rates, 
number of health visits and visitors, levels of public investment in primary services, and  
fiscal deficits.  Relatively few examine economic growth, and fewer still focus on 
industrial policy success. 
 A few who do include Rodríguez-Posé and Bwire (2004), who find that devolution 
in Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Spain, and the US has effects on economic growth that 
are usually insignificant, or else negative.  Martinez-Vazquez and McNab’s (2003) 
survey of over 120 studies finds mixed results on both the direct and indirect effects of 
decentralizing reforms on growth, with no clear pattern of evidence one way or the 
other.  Feld, Baskaran and Schnellenbach (2008) find that, “Overall, the empirical 
evidence is rather inconclusive whether there is an effect at all.” 
 In their study of Swiss federalism, Feld, Kirchgassner and Schaltegger (2004) 
find that matching grants (cooperative federalism) decrease economic performance, 
while tax competition (competitive federalism) improves the allocation of public funds, 
and hence growth in cantons.  And cantonal fragmentation does not seem to affect 
GDP/capita.  And Asatryan and Feld (2011) find no robust effects of fiscal federalism on 
growth in 23 OECD countries between 1975-2000.  In sum, we do not know how, or 
indeed if, federal structures and decentralized power lead to higher or lower economic 
growth, nor if they improve the implementation of industrial policy.  This is both odd and 
unfortunate. 
 This paper analyzes government failure and success, and how to promote 
success and avoid failure. We begin with decentralization’s first-order effects, and when 
reform does and does not lead to government failure.  We then consider other ways in 
which federal competition can indirectly support industrial policy. 
 
 4 
 
2. Theory: First-order effects 
When the evidence is unclear and contradictory, one reasonable response is to 
turn to theory for guidance.  Theory can potentially help understand evidence such as 
this by elucidating the underlying mechanisms at work, and help us to distinguish more 
from less important evidence.  But first we must distinguish between two different 
dimensions of federal competition: (i) first vs. second-order effects, and (ii) ‘between’ vs. 
‘within’ competition.  I use the term ‘first-order effects’ in the strict, technical sense: 
direct effects, or the first derivative of reform.  By this I do not mean effects that are 
larger, more important, or somehow favored.  Indeed, it is not unusual for the second-
order (indirect) effects of a particular intervention to be far larger than its first-order 
effects. 
For example, the first-order effects of untrammeled money creation, when an 
increasing quantity of money chases the same amount of goods, are inflation.  But even 
hyperinflation, corrosive as it is, is less damaging than the social uprisings or political 
collapse that can ensue if excessive money creation is sustained.  Consider, for 
example, the experience of Weimar Germany.  But to understand second-order effects 
properly, it is important first to understand the first-order effects of reform, if only 
because how the direct effects evolve can strongly shape the indirect effects that follow. 
What, then, do decentralizing reforms do?  Their primary effects are to 
reorganize political authority, alter the relations of accountability, and change 
expenditure patterns across the state (Faguet 2012).  They devolve resources and 
political authority from higher to lower levels of government that have their own 
democratic mandates and are substantially independent of the center within a given 
geographic and functional domain.  The first-order effects that we should expect such a 
reform to have concern public sector efficiency, effectiveness, and the quality of public 
decision-making.  Public policy and services might become better informed of local 
conditions, more responsive to local voters, or simply cheaper if unit costs fall.  Any or 
all of these effects might also run in the opposite direction.  But we have no reason to 
expect the reorganization of authority and expenditure to directly affect growth.  Any 
effects on growth will come through the second-order effects of reform, as more efficient 
or effective public goods and services help the economy to grow faster.  Any effects on 
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the success of industrial policy will come through improved public investments and 
better-quality decision making. 
Secondly, most proponents of federal competition for industrial policy refer to 
‘between competition’ – that is, competition between subnational units for investment, 
business activity, and skilled workers.  Much of this activity might be better referred to 
as parallel experimentation, as municipalities and states only rarely compete for 
resources in a direct sense, but are more often “measured up” against one another 
indirectly.4  Another, more regular and probably more intense form of federal 
competition is ‘within competition’ – the competition for power that grants control over 
subnational resources via some form of subnational politics.  This, as we shall see, is an 
important source of government failure, and thus merits close examination. 
 
3. Analyzing government failure and success 
 How exactly does government failure work?  Can it be avoided?  Let us proceed 
inductively, exploiting natural variations in local government quality in a recent, notable 
case of radical decentralization reform: Bolivia.  We first consider direct evidence of a 
very low and a very high-functioning municipal government, before stepping back to 
theorize about decentralization and the determinants of responsive, accountable 
governance.  Consider first Viacha.  When Bolivia decentralized in 1994, Viacha was 
the 13th largest municipality in the country.  Located on the old road from La Paz to 
Oruro, it is was an industrial city with powerful cement, beer and brick and tile 
businesses connected to a large rural hinterland that stretched to Peru.  Charagua, by 
contrast, was a small agricultural town lost in the enormous, semi-arid Chaco, with a 
huge rural catchment area measuring 72,000 km2 – larger than Costa Rica or Holland 
and 2½ times the size of Belgium.  This catchment area was sparsely populated by 
subsistence-farming Guaraní indigenous people, whose education was lacking and 
whose poverty was profound.  Figure 1 places both on the map of Bolivia. 
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Figure 1: Map of Bolivia with Viacha and Charagua indicated 
 
  
 
With its rich resource base, easy access to the professional and technical 
resources of La Paz, and comparatively low transportation costs, conventional theories 
of public management would have predicted that Viacha would have the better 
source: US Central Intelligence Agency: Maps Released to the Public; 
downloaded from the University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library 
Map Collection (http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps). 
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municipal government.  By contrast, Charagua, more than 5 hours by dirt road from the 
nearest city – roads which became impassable during the rainy season – lacking a 
resource base and trained professionals, and with a huge, poor rural area that the 
mayor could not physically reach during 4-5 months of the year, would seem destined 
for low-quality government.  But in fact the opposite was true. 
Viacha 
Viacha's  mayor systematically sabotaged accountability and public oversight.  
The municipal council was passive, ignorant, and unwilling to assume responsibility. 
Together, they produced a local government that was unresponsive, violent and corrupt.  
Some evidence for this includes: (1) Local government expanded its payroll by more 
than 100% without increasing its administrative ability or technical skills: (2) A grand 
municipal coliseum building was unfinished, and wildly over budget 12 years after 
breaking ground; (3) An infamous exploding sewerage projects saw politically 
connected contractors dig up existing pipes and replace them with faulty ones which 
subsequently exploded, throwing human waste up onto the sidewalks of the city, and 
leaving gaping craters in some of its principal streets; (4) A national audit charged the 
mayor with corruption and malfeasance. 
Charagua 
In Charagua, by contrast, local government was participatory and responsive, led 
by strong organizations of government produce high-quality policy outputs. Evidence for 
this includes: (1) The mayor topped a departmental ranking; (2) Despite huge growth in 
the local budget of 6,500% as a result of decentralization, operating costs were kept to 
only 4% of the total; (3) The same national government audits that damned Viacha 
praised Charagua; (4) Even where specific policy priorities were disputed, local 
testimony overwhelmingly concurred that local governments was honest and hard-
working.   
How can we explain these surprising differences?  Figure 2 lays out a model of 
government effectiveness that shows how economic interests interact with civic 
organizations to produce a local politics that is open and competitive, or not.  The model 
works like this. 
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Our goal is to explain where government is responsive to local needs and 
accountable to voters, and where it is not. The deep study of our two case studies along 
with seven more, plus exhaustive analysis of a database containing all of Bolivia’s 
municipalities, people, and territory, imply that the proximate cause of high-quality local 
government is an open and substantively competitive local politics. But open, 
competitive local politics is not an exogenous feature of any locality. It is not somehow 
given that politics in one place is open but in another place is closed. Rather, this is 
endogenously determined by the interaction of two key sets of actors: economic 
interests, and civic organizations. 
The first set consists of businesses, landowners, and other important economic 
actors and organizations, and focuses on the way they lobby and fund political activity. 
Where economic interests are more diverse and heterogeneous, they will tend to have a 
wider array of interests, and will accordingly support a broader array of political parties 
and candidates. By contrast, where a single economic interest or organization is 
dominant, one political party will tend to benefit at the expense of all others. 
Where civil society is concerned, it is a simple empirical regularity that some 
places are characterized by a highly organized, active civil society full of groups that 
intermediate between the individual and her government, and others are not. In the 
former, specific local needs and priorities are given stronger voice by virtue of being 
shared amongst many citizens and identified and voiced by their groups, which act as 
an important counterweight to the lobby power of firms. In the latter, citizens operate in 
a more atomized way, the “common-ness” of certain needs and wants is less often 
discovered, and the voice of society is much weaker in local affairs. 
Where many active, organized civic groups interact with diverse, heterogeneous 
economic interests, politics will tend to be open and competitive, and the competition 
will center on real local needs and priorities as defined (differently) by both civic and 
economic actors. By contrast, where such interaction is missing, because economic 
interest is homogenous or society is unorganized, politics will tend to be closed, 
uncompetitive, and dominated by entrenched groups or interests. As a result, 
government will be far less responsive and accountable to voters that would otherwise 
be the case.  Figure 2 illustrates these relationships graphically. 
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Figure 2: A model of government effectiveness 
 
 
 Both corruption and ineptitude in Viacha, and Charagua’s transparent, 
responsive, accountable government can be explained using the same framework. In 
Viacha, the dominant economic interest was the CBN brewery, which became the 
monopsonistic provider of finance to the entire political system. This company acted 
with fiercely partisan aggression to support its own political party, the UCS, and actively 
undermine or corrupt opposition parties in order to quell political competition, remove 
electoral challenges, and thoroughly dominate the political system. In this case, "its own 
party" is not a figure of speech, but is rather descriptively correct. For the CBN brewery 
and the UCS political party were both founded by the same man, Max Fernandez, who 
ran them as a single family enterprise offering products in the politics and beer markets. 
The brewery put its entire distribution network, trucking beer to the smallest towns and 
villages throughout the countryside, at the service of the party. Political rallies were 
manned by workers in overalls in the particular shade of blue that both brewery and 
party shared, with the beer logo emblazoned on the front and the political logo 
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emblazoned on the back. Huge banners above the stage read "Drink Paceña beer", and 
underneath, "Vote UCS". 
The brewery’s efforts were not only positive in nature, but negative as well.  I was 
told in detail by both sides of the transaction that the local CBN chief paid the head of 
the local MIR political party to remove his top political candidate, an elderly doctor 
known by most urban Viacheños, and replace him with a politician known to be corrupt. 
"But he's corrupt," the MIR leader objected. "Yes exactly!" roared the beer boss. "You've 
got it. And if you don't do it not only you won't get the money, but I'll screw you like 
you've never been screwed before!" And so the cash was paid and the deal was sealed. 
And so local politics became stagnant and uncompetitive, with no substantive 
choice, where parties competed on small gift giving (e.g. blue plastic buckets). During a 
period where turnouts throughout Bolivia were more than doubling, in Viacha voter 
apathy grew and turnouts plummeted some 40%. One might hope that civil society 
might contract such a negative dynamic. But in Viacha, society was doubly divided 
against itself: "white, European" urbanites against indigenous peasant rural farmers; 
and rural peasants of the Machacas region, who retained pre-Columbian forms of social 
organization, against rural peasants from regions closer to the city, where peasant 
unions prevailed. As a result, Viachan society suffered episodic outburst of violence, 
endemic mistrust, and widespread collective action failures. The ultimate result of this 
governance system was a local municipal governments that was unresponsive, 
unaccountable, untransparent, and corrupt. 
In Charagua, by contrast, the most important economic interests were cattle 
ranchers, by nature independent family-run enterprises, who were far more 
heterogeneous collectively then Viacha's monolithic brewery, and who supported a 
wider range of political parties. As a result, Charaguan politics was open, competitive, 
and featured a high degree of political entrepreneurialism. The best example of the last 
is when the MIR political party approached Guaraní leaders and proposed an alliance 
whereby the two sides agreed a political platform, the party adopted any candidate of 
the Guaraníes’ selection as its own, and Guaraní villages voted for the MIR en masse. 
Such strategy could only work because local civil society – the third element in 
our model – was highly structured and coherent in the form of the Guaraní people's 
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assembly (APG in Spanish), which built upwardly stratified layers of representation 
upon the traditional mechanisms of community self-government in the Guaraní world, 
such that there were APG representatives at the village, municipal, provincial, 
departmental, and national levels. The presence of the APG meant the MIR found a 
credible, sophisticated, legitimate interlocutor with whom to negotiate – an interlocutor 
who could keep its side of the bargain and get out the rural vote for the first time in living 
history. As a result, the MIR went from the electoral wilderness in Charagua to victory, 
strode confidently into town hall, and took over. The government that resulted was 
transparent, responsive, and accountable, pushing through a huge program of social 
investment in rural areas such as Guaraní villagers had never seen before. 
 
4. Transformation of Governance: Within and Between Competition 
Such were the effects of strikingly different local dynamics on a common 
institutional shock in Bolivia, where “within competition” of very different natures 
produced very different outcomes.  The following 13 years saw dramatic changes in 
both municipalities, not least because “within competition”  combined with “between 
competition” to accelerate changes that in Viacha ended up transforming government, 
and in Charagua deepened participation and transparency. 
I returned to Viacha 13 years later to find a corrupt, obtuse local government 
transformed into an open, transparent, responsive administration. Some evidence to 
support this claim includes: 
 All 63 rural communities in the municipality now have electricity and potable 
water; 
 Over 70% of schools have internet; 
 The mayor provides quarterly public reports, weekly reports to the local 
oversight committee; 
 Spending plans have been devolved down to the district/community level; 
 Three successive national audits praised municipal performance; and 
 A UNDP report ranked Viacha in the top sixth of all municipalities in Bolivia. 
How did this change come about?  The key came when the factor distorting 
Viachan politics – the CBN bottling plant – was closed down by its new owner, the 
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Argentine Quilmes brewery, for purely business-related reasons. The removal of this 
exogenous constraint on local political activity permitted the gradual, accelerating 
ascent of civil society in Viacha over the following decade.  Civic associations grew in 
size, integrity, and ability. And then, when a modernizing candidate promising 
transparency and efficiency emerged, Viacha’s urban and rural civic groups were able 
to coalesce around him, and he was easily elected mayor. The broad and striking 
changes that he put into place in town hall led to the transformation of government 
processes and outputs described above.  Throughout this period, political competition 
combined with the example of nearby localities to drive change.  After a long climb out 
of the hole of government failure, voters had learned the costs of conflict and paralysis 
and did not want to fall back in. 
Thirteen years later, the changes in Charagua were less dramatic but 
nonetheless impressive.  Local government had improved further, especially in terms of 
participation and transparency, which had deepened considerably.  Some evidence to 
support these claims include: 
 All rural communities now had schools, health posts, and electricity; 
 Budgeting and planning were devolved to the district/community level; 
 The mayor provides quarterly public reports on municipal works and the 
budget; 
 Communities manage budgets and projects directly; and 
 A UNDP report ranked Charagua third-best nationwide. 
How did this change come about?  One key factor was the approval of the 
national Law of Citizen Associations, which liberalized what sorts of organizations could 
register for elections, allowing the APG to compete directly rather than through an 
established party.  There ensued an APG-MAS (President Evo Morales’ Movimiento al 
Socialismo party) coalition, which brought political stability to Charagua over five years, 
permitting longer-term planning and public investments.  Thirdly, ranchers both 
individually and (especially) through their association chose to work with the Guarani-
dominated local government, rather than attempting to resist or undermine it, as 
happened elsewhere in the country.  Throughout this happy period, it was clear that in a 
context of political competition plus high participation, the experience of good 
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government led to an endogenous rise in local voters’ standards and expectations for 
what local government could and should do.  This in turn coaxed ever-increasing levels 
of performance from successive administrations, who similarly internalized voters’ rising 
expectations into their political calculations.  Responsible, flexible, accountable 
government was the result. 
Hence government is successful when our model (see figure 2) operates as it 
should – in particular when economic interests and civic groups interact through politics 
to reveal, debate, and trade off their competing interests, and so fashion policy.  By 
contrast, government failure looms when homogeneous economic interests monopolize 
the supply of political finance, or when civil society is atomized and unorganized or inert.  
The model’s ability to explain the changes in government performance in both places 
over 13 years, by analyzing the interactions between economic actors and civic groups, 
further confirms its explanatory power. 
 
5. Second-order effects 
These, then, are the determinants of government failure, but also of government 
success in the form of accountable, responsive governance.  These first-order effects of 
federal reforms can have second-order effects on industrial policy to the extent that 
higher-quality subnational governments are more likely to choose reasonable industrial 
policies and implement them well.  And government failure must be avoided if industrial 
policy is to avoid falling prey to the crippling threats of capture and corruption, or plain 
incompetence. 
Do federalizing reforms have other second-order effects conducive to successful 
industrial policy?  Myerson (2013) draws on the economic analysis of oligopolies to 
answer affirmatively.  A well-ordered federal system can significantly increase political 
competition, providing strong incentives for higher-quality policy making and tighter 
reins of accountability to the governed, in the following interrelated but conceptually 
distinct ways: 
1. Alternative routes for entering national politics.  If the only route is via national 
parties, parliamentary leaders can keep out challengers, oligopolize power, and 
raise their corruption-price.  Policy becomes less responsive to citizens’ wishes or to 
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the requirements of economic growth.  Federalism can provide alternative routes 
into national politics though provincial and local governments, thus increasing total 
competition and so the quality and probity of a nation’s policymaking. 
2. New opportunities for independently elected politicians to demonstrate competence.  
The possibility that successful local officials will advance to higher levels of power in 
a federal system increases the elasticity of political demand for politicians at each 
level below the top, and thus increases their competitive incentives to offer better 
public services.   
3. Greater effort by subnational politicians to win popular support, which strengthens 
national parties competitively in national elections.  This mechanism works in both 
directions, hence… 
4. National party sponsorship of local challengers can raise competition in local 
elections, and so improve the quality of local policy-making. 
 Weingast (2013) makes a deeper point concerning the underlying distribution of 
power in a society.  All successful societies limit the stakes of power by restricting the 
scope of political authority to act against the interests of citizens, especially the 
powerful.  There are two broad ways of doing so: General rules or Special privileges.  
General rules, such as the general incorporation of limited liability companies, are 
usually run administratively and are open to all qualifying adults.  Special privileges, 
such as special incorporation of limited liability companies, usually require acts of 
parliaments and typically confer rights and privileges to individuals favored by the state.  
General rules produce open access regimes, which characterize developed countries.  
Special privileges produce limited access regimes, which characterize developing 
countries.  They limit access to markets and organizational forms privileged by law in 
order to create and distribute rents to favored individuals and groups.  As a result, such 
economies suffer higher informality, lower investment and innovation, and lower growth. 
 How would industrial policy fare under each?  It is straightforward to see that 
industrial policy in a limited access regime will quickly degenerate into clientelism, rent-
seeking, and capture.  The toolbox of industrial policy includes some very powerful tools 
with sector-wide, and even economy-wide, effects, such as tariffs, subsidies, intellectual 
property rules, and the exchange rate.  Allowing governments to manipulate such tools 
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in a context designed to create and distribute rents to favored groups seems destined to 
distort resource allocation for the sake of factional gain rather than broad economic 
development.  Even if capture is avoided, the power of industrial policy will be far lower 
in markets where access is limited and competition is lower.  By contrast, open access 
regimes are designed to make markets and legal privileges accessible to most adults.  
Such markets are by construction more competitive, innovative, and efficient.  They will 
tend to respond more powerfully to industrial policies that are, in turn, less likely to 
become distorted. 
 What does all of this have to do with federalism?  Federalism and 
decentralization are incentive-compatible ways to limit the power of government by 
dividing this power up amongst different levels, rather than concentrating it in the hands 
of a single authority.  The multiple tiers of government that federalism creates increase 
the chances that a citizen’s rights will be protected by one or another level of 
government.  By reducing the discretion of (central) government, federalism reduces the 
power of politicians to appropriate citizens’ property, and protects citizens from abuses 
of power. 
Decentralization and federalism are thus an alternative to limited access regimes 
for limiting the stakes of power and restricting the scope of political authority over 
citizens’ rights, assets, and economic activity.  In developing countries where power-
limiting institutions are scarce, federalism provides an incentive-compatible way to limit 
the power of central (and regional and local) authorities.  It can protect the interests of 
the powerful, and along the way for all citizens, while simultaneously building a culture 
of democratic practice throughout the length and breadth of a country.  Developing 
countries can migrate to open-access regimes, with their greater dynamism and faster 
growth, while continuing to safeguard the interests of elites.  Although seldom 
acknowledged, this is the crux of the argument in favor of federal industrial policy. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Industrial policy hovers in the intellectual space between market failure and 
government failure.  Can subnational competition overcome government failure and 
make industrial policy more effective?  The empirical evidence is limited and 
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inconclusive.  This paper analyzed the first and second-order effects of federalist 
reforms, and then distinguished two types of federal competition ‘between’ vs. ‘within’-
competition.  Although most commentators refer to the latter, the former is probably 
more important. Federalism’s first-order effects are on public sector efficiency, 
effectiveness, and the quality of public decision-making – that is to say, government 
failure or success.  It only affects industrial policy indirectly, through this channel.  When 
diverse economic interests and civic groups interact through politics to reveal, debate, 
and trade off their competing interests, and so fashion policy, government will tend to be 
responsive and accountable.  Where economic interests are homogeneous or civil 
society is inert, government failure looms.  All of this refers to ‘within’ competition.  
Further second-order effects of federalism include increasing the level of competition in 
a political system, and limiting the power of government against citizens in ways that 
make democracy compatible with open access regimes.  Industrial policy is far more 
likely to succeed in the latter due to greater economic participation and dynamism.  This 
is the crux of the argument in favor of federal industrial policy. 
 These arguments imply that federalist reforms can contribute to the institutional 
changes that accompany broad historical transitions to increasing wealth and freedom.  
The study of such transitions has seen a remarkable resurgence in recent years.  
Regardless of whether development transitions are conceived of as leading to open-
access societies and economies (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009), or inclusive 
institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), theorists agree that they consist of a 
complex of interdependent changes across government, the economy and social 
relations (Brett 2009). 
 Many of these changes, such as technical upgrading in the productive sector, are 
not susceptible to federalism.  For others, such as infrastructure expansion and human 
capital formation, federalism can be a useful contributory measure.  But for some of the 
most important transformations involving governance and the exercise of power, such 
as improving public accountability, increasing political competition, decreasing 
corruption, limiting government power, and enhancing political and economic stability, 
decentralization and federalism are centrally implicated. 
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